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Jorge Melendez, known as Commander Jonas, chief of the FMLN (Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front) southeastern army division, was interviewed recently in El Salvador by PRENSA
LATINA correspondent Arturo Lozza. The first part of the interview was published in the 03/04/87
issue of CAU. Major topics of the interview broadcast by PRENSA LATINA on March 3 and 4
were Melendez's remarks on strategies by the FMLN and the FDR (Democratic Revolutionary
Front) to involve the majority of the Salvadoran people in the liberation struggle, and the formation
of a single revolutionary party. Lozza: Abroad it is usually said there is a type of equilibrium or
stagnation in the struggle, that nobody can win. Melendez: We do not see it that way. It is obvious
a new stage has been achieved, as the war has been maintained throughout the country. First,
the struggle for economic improvements is being transformed into a political struggle, since
economic progress means cutting the military budget. Another important point is that precisely
when the regime's political credibility is being shattered, [Duarte's government] decides to
upgrade and expand the army. This is producing a conflict with young men and their parents who
oppose obligatory military recruitment. Next, the regime aims at depopulating certain areas in the
country to isolate the guerrillas. However, [Duarte's officials] are faced with housing shortages and
pressures from refugees who number over 500,000 to return to their homes. Thus far the regime
has not permitted them to return to their places of origin because it is known that most are FMLN
sympathizers. If the refugees return to the guerrilla- controlled areas, they will become supporters of
the FMLN in a direct fashion. A new strategic offensive by the FMLN and its supporters throughout
the country is being prepared. Lozza: Is there a possibility for the formation of a single revolutionary
party? Melendez: Since the founding of the FMLN and during the six years of the war, the five
organizations that make up the Front have been working together and have passed through several
stages, from coordination of, to joint political and military actions...FMLN strategy has been devised
jointly by the five groups for some time, and this has given us the basis for unity. Lozza: Could you
describe the nature of disagreements among the five organizations within the FMLN? Melendez:
While all of us pertain to the left, each group had its own tactics...each would fight for its own way
of operating. Thus, we had to deal with this problem...a problem which, by the way, emerges in
revolutionary movements everywhere. Although the principles of democratic centralism had been
defined long time ago, the problem was in different concepts and analyses of situations...We were
all revolutionaries, but...the ways in which a given organization engaged in struggle sometimes
subtracted from the struggles of another organization. This was happening in El Salvador. We
decided to meet, to discuss...and then began to coordinate our actions while at the same time
maintaining our differences. We created a bloc on the basis of advancing together, the only means
to win the war. Lozza: Being together does not necessarily mean being unified. Melendez: Right.
We had different styles, concepts, history, symbols and heroes. Those things made the difference,
although we all faced the same problem. It was logical that in six or seven years of coordinating
our efforts...our organizations would influence each other. The need for a synthesis came about. At
present we are united in concepts and strategy, with the same political and military tactics, the same
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mass line, a single international diplomatic statement, a single line of alliances. Lozza: If you have all
these things in common, why have you not yet established a single revolutionary party? Melendez:
The difficulty lies in different criteria and practical working styles used in applying a common
position. Those criteria and styles are ultimately what the militants in each organization express.
There are formal and less formal organizations. Some have a series of theoretical requirements,
while others follow different patterns to reach agreements or break them. In brief, this is an issue
of personality, or differences in style. Since we already had the same strategy and tactics...toward
promoting the same plan of action, in practice we have had to discuss the most suitable style to
advance the plan. This process of discussion is positive because it...allows the improvement of all
working styles and to achieve synthesis and unification... Lozza: Has any one group become the
vanguard in the revolutionary struggle? Melendez: The concept of vanguard is important...there are
often misinterpretations, such as the notion that a vanguard manages everything. For the FMLN, the
vanguard is the political force capable of bringing together the broadest social and political sectors
for the sake of revolutionary objectives. What we are seeking to achieve is uniting all organizations
with the FMLN as the vanguard to revolutionary victory. The development of social and political
support for a given organization within the FMLN is articulated in such a way...that eventually
styles and concepts will be unified toward the formation of a single party. Lozza: Are you then in
the final stage toward the formation of a single party? Melendez: Yes. We now have the political
and ideological bases for it...There is agreement to avoid pre-defining leadership at any level. Each
of the five organizations has its political organization, central committee, militants, structures. The
unification of the FMLN means those various separate levels and structures will not be maintained.
The entire FMLN will have to decide on a single structure and so forth, and who will be appointed
to act as leaders. This is a momentous step. In fact, the FMLN general command is already acting
as a single leadership as it defines political positions and tactical responses. Lozza: But meanwhile,
each organization has kept its own leadership. Doesn't this create problems? Melendez: Yes. In
principle, it is easy to make decisions, but in practice how can one have five organizations with
separate structures working as a united front? The first step was the creation of joint structures
[among the five organizations] in each region and zone of the country. Plans to put the general
command's decisions into action were elaborated there. The general command issues general plans,
and each regional organization determines the means to carry out the plan in line with its particular
conditions. Each joint structure then implements the same plan within its area. Over time, it is
believed this arrangement will bring about the increasing subordination of individual structures
to the joint structures. Every day there are more cadres working for the single plan, rather than
plans worked out separately. There are still parallel leaderships, but they are disappearing as they
become subordinated to the application of a single plan implemented at the national, regional and
local levels. It should also be emphasized that joint decision-making is gaining in importance. The
best prepared cadres pertain to those joint organizations. Lozza: Is it also true that fighting together
is a decisive factor in the unification process? Melendez: Of course. Hardships unite people. But
the fact that we are moving forward on the organizational level has had more influence. The real
possibility of achieving victory through unified action has facilitated this organizational process.
When leftist groups had no prospects for victory, they were scattered and each sought to impose
its own line amid dozens of other lines. But when the war reaches the level it has in El Salvador,
where it is clear what must be done to win, it becomes easier to develop a common position. If our
efforts are scattered, the enemy will destroy us. That reality unites the people and the vanguard.
If there is progress in the struggle, it is perceived as the outcome of increasing unity. This process
may be likened to a funnel: the struggle begins on broad somewhat dissimilar bases and then
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narrows into a single united force. We are now entering the narrow part of the funnel...we are
tight, united. In military actions, when one's life depends on others, people are united. The same
happens in the countryside. When repression is extensive, the success of the underground depends
on everyone's help. If the popular movement does not close ranks, the enemy wins. Lozza: Under
what conditions do you see the FMLN taking power? Melendez: The country is small, 21,000 square
kilometers, densely populated, 250 inhabitants per square kilometer, and crisscrossed by roadways
and communications systems. There are large numbers of people working small plots of land.
Their revolutionary violence would affect the entire country...One can predict that at the hour of
victory there will be a convergence of the people's general uprising with the revolutionary military
offensive, together with all manner of demonstrations, walkouts, etc. Next, I believe the army troops
are going to play a role in this process. The rank and file of the army oppose the imperialist interests
advocated by that institution. An uprising within the army is predictable. Thus, I believe the victory
will be a combined result of the mass participation of people throughout the country, the FMLN
offensive, and deterioration within the army.

-- End --
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